From word to deeds
The recognition of Palestine by Ireland, Norway, Slovenia, and Spain shows how European diplomacy can go from words to deeds. Coupled with concrete steps to affect domestic change on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides, this could help mobilise international diplomacy behind the EU’s longstanding foreign policy goal of securing a sovereign and viable Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with its capital in East Jerusalem. Reviving a credible diplomatic track in support of Palestinian self-determination is also an important prerequisite for securing a sustainable post-conflict solution for Gaza.
“Reviving a credible diplomatic track in support of Palestinian self-determination is also an important prerequisite for securing a sustainable post-conflict solution for Gaza.”
In late May, Ireland, Norway and Spain formally recognised Palestine. They were followed soon after by Slovenia. The move itself was far from unprecedented. Over 140 countries had previously already recognised Palestine. Amongst these are several other members of the European Union such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Sweden.
Nevertheless, as the war in Gaza continues to rage, the timing of the move has gone some small way to counter Arab public perceptions of EU double standards which has severely undercut European soft-power across the Middle East. It may also encourage other European countries to follow-suit. France in particular has been contemplating a similar move for some time, even before the victory of the left-wing New Popular Front during legislative elections there in June.
The coordinated action by Madrid, Oslo, Dublin and Ljubljana is intended as a high-profile signal of continued political support Palestinian self-determination at a time of expanded Israeli settlement activity in East Jerusalem and the West Bank which is eroding the viability of a future two-state solution.
Empowering Palestinian moderates
In the wake of Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel on 7 October and Israel’s destructive response against Gaza, these European capitals have also expressed their desire to help kick start a new diplomatic effort that can empower Palestinian moderates. The aim is to demonstrate that there is a credible alternative to armed violence that can secure Palestinian national rights and independence. Setting out a viable pathway to a two-state solution is a also necessary element in securing a viable “day after” for Gaza once fighting stops.
“To be impactful, recognition of Palestine will have to be matched by other additional steps to challenge Israel’s internationally unlawful actions, including its annexation of Palestinian land, enabling of widespread settler violence, and disproportionate targeting of civilians in Gaza.”
While recognition has been characterised as largely symbolic, it does have more practical elements. The four European countries included a territorial clause in their declarations, indicating that they were recognising the State of Palestine based on the 1967 borders. Predictably, Israeli politicians were quick to decry this as an anti-Israel step. But by recognising Palestine within its 1967 borders, these European countries are also further re-affirming the State of Israel’s right to exist within its own internationally recognised borders. Nor does it prevent future territorial modifications resulting from negotiations.
The move is however another important rejection of attempts by Israel’s settler movement and former US president Donald Trump to reduce Palestinian aspirations to a “state-minus” made up of disconnected Bantustans in the West Bank and Gaza. This could bolster efforts to expand differentiation measures against the settlements, including banning all settlement products and financial services.
To be impactful, recognition of Palestine will have to be matched by other additional steps to challenge Israel’s internationally unlawful actions, including its annexation of Palestinian land, enabling of widespread settler violence, and disproportionate targeting of civilians in Gaza.
Despite internal divisions, the EU has imposed two rounds of sanctions targeting violent Israeli settlers, organisations and outposts. Member states have also asked the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process Sven Koopmans to identify potential measures that could be taken against Israel in response to its international law violations in Gaza and continued ignoring of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling to end its military actions. This could include suspending the EU-Israel Association Agreement – a move advocated by Ireland and Spain.
In parallel, European government should press President Mahmoud Abbas to revive Palestinian institutions and restore national unity. This will require the sort of deep transformation that goes beyond the technocratic reforms envisaged by the US and Palestinian Authority (PA) prime minister Muhammad Mustafa. Instead, Europeans must focus on the need for Palestinian re-democratisation and institutional reform (such as restoring judicial independence), national reconciliation, tackling human rights abuses, and long-overdue elections. The EU already has ample leverage in this regard given its role as the largest donor to the PA. Recognition can provide a second, less confrontational, avenue to press Abbas – by making clear that they now expect reciprocal steps relating to Palestinian governance reform.
Getting the Palestinian house in order
Getting the Palestinian house in order would increase and broaden popular support for, and participation in, Palestinian institutions. This though will count for little should the PA collapse due to financial insolvency caused by Israel’s confiscation of Palestinian tax clearance revenues. While Europe and Arab partners could increase their budgetary support, a real fix will require pressure on Israel to reverse its sanctions against the PA.
Ultimately, returning a reformed and unified Palestinian leadership to Gaza remains a key requisite for an effective post-conflict governance and security model, that can deliver for Palestinians and meet Israeli security needs. But this will only be viable if the public standing and legitimacy of the PA is strengthened. This being said, PA revitalisation should not become a pre-condition for a Gaza ceasefire or relaunching a viable peace process, which could give Israel a pretext to stall negotiations.
“Riyadh has been clear that it will not sign a peace agreement with Israel without a credible and irreversible pathway towards Palestinian statehood – which Israel refuses.”
To be credible any call for Palestinian re-democratisation would also have to be matched by an indication of European willingness to accept the outcome of free and fair elections, even if this leads to a PA government supported by Hamas. This will also require a strong political track in support of Palestinian self-determination. Without this, any post-conflict political track for Gaza will be shorn of all legitimacy, bolstering Palestinian perceptions that armed resistance is the only available pathway.
Clearly, the EU cannot by itself effect the deep change in Israeli and Palestinian positions that would be required to unlock a credible political track. While all eyes continue to be turned towards the US and President Joe Biden for decisive action, a potential Arab contribution should not be ignored. In this regard, tightening cooperation between European and Arab states could produce tangible progress even as the US continues to pursue what is likely an illusory regional grand bargain based on Israeli-Saudi normalisation.
“Faced with a lukewarm response by the US, Arab members have tightened their engagement with Europe to advance their plan.”
Riyadh has been clear that it will not sign a peace agreement with Israel without a credible and irreversible pathway towards Palestinian statehood – which Israel refuses.
Over the past months, an Arab “Contact Group” (Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE) – has circulated an Arab vision plan to stabilise post-conflict Gaza and advance a political track for implementing a two-state solution with East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. In exchange, the Arab world would offer Israel full normalisation and integration into an inclusive regional security architecture. Integral to this is a ceasefire in Gaza and the deployment of an international protection force there to facilitate the return of the PA.
But faced with a lukewarm response by the US, Arab members have tightened their engagement with Europe to advance their plan.
“The next challenge will be to operationalise European-Arab cooperation.”
The decision by Norway, Ireland, Slovenia and Spain has facilitated this tightening engagement, leading to repeated calls and visits by Arab foreign ministers to European capitals in the weeks and months preceding their public announcements. Speaking at the European Council of Foreign Relations’ (ECFR) annual meeting in Madrid in July, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud commended what Spain and others had done through recognition because that is “one of the few slivers of hope that remains out there.”
The next challenge will be to operationalise European-Arab cooperation.
“The hard reality is that Hamas will need to be included as part of any “day-after” plan. However, this needs to be based on a negotiated political arrangement with President Abbas and his Fatah party to allow for the return of a reformed PA to Gaza."
This could include the convening of a joint preparatory peace conference to rally international support behind a common push for a sustainable ceasefire in Gaza and implement a two-state solution within a defined time frame. EU and Arab foreign ministers have also discussed the formation of joint working groups to develop a common diplomatic initiative in support of the Arab Vision Plan. While these have yet to be agreed on, they could allow European and Arab states to pool their political resources and energy to tackle several key areas that could help unlock progress, such as:
Pushing for unhindered humanitarian aid access to Gaza: This will require greater international efforts to hold Israel to account over its responsibilities as the occupying power to enable safe and unrestricted aid deliveries. International partners could also look to create a new humanitarian coordination mechanism for Gaza. This could facilitate stepped-up planning involving the UN, the US, Europe and Arab states relating to issues such as rubble removal, sanitation, fuel and energy, evacuating Gazans who need urgent medical care.
Supporting PA reform and capacity building to prepare it to return to Gaza. Here the EU has much to offer beyond funding. For example its existing EUPOL COPS (EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories) and EUBAM (European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine) could contribute technical expertise and capacity building relating to security sector reform necessary for returning PA security forces to Gaza and facilitating border crossing arrangements. Beyond funding, Arab states have indicated they could also provide troops to support the PA’s return to Gaza as part of a ceasefire agreement.
Advancing Palestinian reconciliation: the hard reality is that Hamas will need to be included as part of any “day-after” plan. However, this needs to be based on a negotiated political arrangement with President Abbas and his Fatah party to allow for the return of a reformed PA to Gaza. This would likely require the formation of a new PA government that benefits from broader factional consensus and Hamas’s future integration into a revived PLO. This is more likely to succeed if paired with a bigger political vision and will also require European incentives and disincentives towards both Hamas and Fatah/PA.
Challenging unilateral Israeli actions that violate international law, drive instability, and threaten the survivability of the PA and two-state solution. While no single party can effectively pressure Israel (especially under Prime Minister Netanyahu), a concerted effort involving the US, Europeans, Egypt, Jordan and Abraham Accord countries could gradually shift Israeli calculations in support of a ceasefire in Gaza and future de-occupation. Besides support for ongoing International Criminal Court (ICC) and ICJ action, European and Arab states have other means of leverage, including a European arms embargo, sanctions, and freezing the EU-Israel Association Agreement and Abraham Accords signed between Israel and Arab states like the UAE in 2020.
Europe’s Achilles heel
“I hope Europe will play a more active role…Europe does need to make a decision about how relevant it wants to be on the international stage. Gaza is one of those test cases.” (Prince Faisal bin Farhan)
As ever though, Europe’s Achilles heel remains its lack of unity. While western members such as Ireland and Spain are keep to expand cooperation with the Arab contact group, others who are more closely aligned with Israel, in particular eastern members, have been dragging their feet. In the absence of a unified EU position, a number of European actors will continue to pursue their own independent, and at times competing, initiatives.
Continued incoherence and paralysis will not only blunt European effectiveness but also risk passing up an important opportunity to demonstrate to Arab states that the EU can be a serious foreign policy actor. As the Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan warned: “I hope Europe will play a more active role…Europe does need to make a decision about how relevant it wants to be on the international stage. Gaza is one of those test cases. We are all watching. We are all evaluating whether Europe has a unified stance towards the principles it espouses.”
© Qantara.de 2024
Hugh Lovatt is a senior policy fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Programme at the think tank European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Lovatt has focussed extensively on regional geopolitics and advised European policymakers on the conflicts in Israel-Palestine and Western Sahara. He is regularly interviewed and quoted in international media, including by the New York Times, BBC, Christian Science Monitor, Financial Times, AFP, Le Monde, France24, and Al Jazeera.