How to Negotiate with the Taliban

The war against the Taliban has been going on for nine years and NATO forces are easing up on their commitment. Is the time ripe to negotiate with the Taliban? And what would that mean? By Qamar-ul Huda

With over 150,000 troops in Afghanistan, another 30,000 American troops on their way later this year, and a 40 percent increase in Taliban attacks against civilians and military targets in the past four years, it is uncertain whether pre-talk conditions for negotiations are in order to build confidence, diminish mutual mistrust and institute a structured sustainable dialogue system for mediators.

Recently, General David H. Petraeus, commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and US forces, held a closed-door political and military strategy session with representatives of 12 other Muslim-majority countries, including Iran, as well as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

Internationalising the responsibility of Muslim-majority nations is an important step toward stabilising Afghanistan because it strengthens their roles as stakeholders in creating a stable and functional Afghanistan.

Early attempts to start negotiations

In 2008, Saudi Arabia laid the foundation for negotiations when it hosted key Taliban leaders and Afghan officials at a private meeting to discuss a ceasefire and an end to the insurgency.

In the past five years, the Afghan government has taken bold steps to recognise the need to reconcile with Taliban foot soldiers through Afghanistan’s National Reconciliation, General Amnesty and National Stability Law, which was enacted in January 2010, and most recently the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), which aims to strengthen security and civilian institutions of governance while enabling the reintegration of former insurgents into their communities.

For too long, policymakers and military strategists connected to the war in Afghanistan have viewed religious players as either obstacles to peacemaking or the source of conflict. However, the reality is much more nuanced.

We have seen religion as an influential factor in the peace-building and reconciliation processes. Given the malicious enmity between Taliban leaders and Afghan government officials, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s pro-Western alliance, negotiations with the fragmented Taliban will be even more challenging.

Obstacles to negotiations

It is clear that three main Taliban factions – the Quetta Shura, which is the Afghan Taliban’s top leadership council, Hezb-e-Islami and the Haqqani network, which is linked to Pakistan – are unable or unwilling to come to the negotiating table speaking with one voice, so it is worth investing in those groups that have indicated that they are willing to talk.

Although according to Burhanuddin Rabbani – the former Afghan president from 1992 to 1996 and current head of the United National Front in Afghanistan, a coalition of several Afghan political parties – Mullah Zaeef, former Taliban Ambassador and spokesperson, has been involved in discussions to open communication channels to the Quetta Shura and Hezb-e-Islami for several months now.

The Taliban's demands

Mullah Omar, the spiritual father and charismatic leader of the Afghan Taliban, has repeatedly demanded to deal only with non-corrupt officials, and to hold a tribunal for Afghan government officials who have been explicitly linked to the illegal torture and killings of civilians and suspected insurgents.

In this context, there are several multi-layered variables involved in negotiating a deal for Muslim religious actors to make the transformation from insurgents to civilian power sharers. This ultimately requires that other stakeholders consider the Taliban’s world views from a religious narrative. Though some may consider their religious narrative to be contradictory or counterproductive, it must be understood in order to grasp the raison d’être of the 21-year-old Taliban movement.

Negotiations with Taliban mediators will raise issues about implementing an action plan for reconciliation, enforcing a programme of accountability and developing a practical roadmap for the reintegration of former fighters into society without humiliation. Most importantly, third-party mediators will need to guarantee power-sharing agreements and a specific timeline for implementation.

Fostering a culture of peace during negotiations and afterwards will require the synchronised work and involvement of individuals and organisations that are trained in sustainable development, transitional justice, trauma healing, peace building, conflict transformation and sustainable economic and social development.

Qamar-ul Huda

Qamar-ul Huda is a scholar of Islamic studies and Comparative Religion, as well as the senior program officer in the Religion and Peacemaking Program at the United States Institute of Peace.

Editor: Aingeal Flanagan/Qantara.de

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