Turkey's nuclear programme
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Why Turkey won't go nuclear

In this analysis, George Perkovich and Sinan Ulgen explain why Turkey is working hard to build its nuclear energy programme, but is not interested in developing a nuclear weapons system

By George Perkovich & Sinan Ülgen

According to conventional wisdom, if Iran develops nuclear weapons, then Saudi Arabia, Turkey and perhaps Egypt will try to follow suit. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu went further when he addressed the United States Congress in early March, asserting that even allowing Iran a uranium-enrichment programme would "spark a nuclear arms race in the most dangerous part of the planet".

Each of these potential nuclear dominoes should be analysed separately and carefully. And, as far as Turkey is concerned, the conventional wisdom seems to be largely wrong.
Turkey does have a nascent nuclear energy programme. After decades of false starts, the Turkish government signed a contract with Russia in 2010 for the construction and operation of the country's first nuclear power plant. The project, located on Turkey's Mediterranean coast, is now under construction.

The Turkish government's effort to secure other international suppliers has been complicated by the fact that the terms offered by Russia are significantly more generous than those proposed by its competitors. Still, Turkey is in negotiations with a Franco-Japanese consortium for the construction of a second nuclear power plant on the Black Sea.

Launch of the first Turkish nuclear power plant, Akkuyu, in Mersin (photo: picture-alliance/dpa/Anil Bagriyanik/Anadolu Agency)
Launch of the first Turkish nuclear power plant, Akkuyu, in Mersin: "To assert that Turkey will naturally – perhaps inevitably – seek to acquire a nuclear arsenal ignores the important incentives the country has not to militarise its existing civilian energy programme," write George Perkovich and Sinan Ulgen

Growing energy requirements

Turkey has valid economic arguments for developing the capacity to produce nuclear energy. Primary energy imports comprise almost half of Turkey's chronic current-account deficit, because the country imports more than 90 per cent of its oil and natural gas. Moreover, unlike in Europe, Turkey's electricity demand continues to grow at 5–6 per cent per year. Turkish policymakers see nuclear power as an almost indispensable tool for enhancing energy security and reducing the import bill.

These economic interests, combined with national-security considerations, give Turkey an incentive not to seek nuclear weapons. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Turkey is prohibited from developing military applications of the technology. If it were perceived to be breaking this commitment, other states, including those that would otherwise contribute to its nuclear energy programme, would turn against it and jeopardise its ability to meet growing demand at an affordable cost. This, in turn, would undermine the economic growth that has been central to sustaining the government's popular support over the past two decades.

Moreover, Turkey is a member of NATO and thus benefits from the security guarantee that the alliance provides, including its nuclear umbrella. Indeed, the US has based nuclear weapons in Turkey for decades. More recently, NATO and the US have deployed ballistic missile defences in the country. If the Turkish government sought to acquire its own nuclear weapons, it would jeopardise these security guarantees and turn NATO against it.

In any case, Turkey lacks the know-how and technical infrastructure to produce a nuclear weapon quickly, and the country would need a long time – probably more than a decade – to develop this capacity. During this period, Turkey would face severe political, economic and security pressures not only from the US and other NATO states, but also from Russia, Iran and others.

A patriot surface-to-air missile system in Gaziantep, Turkey (photo: Reuters/Osman Orsal)
A patriot surface-to-air missile system in Gaziantep, Turkey. "NATO and the US have deployed ballistic missile defenses in the country. If the Turkish government sought to acquire its own nuclear weapons, it would jeopardise these security guarantees and turn NATO against it," write George Perkovich and Sinan Ulgen

Increased security risk

Meanwhile, Turkey's immediate security threats would be exacerbated. Nuclear weapons would do little to reduce the dangers posed by Syria's violent disintegration, the rise of the Islamic State and the unresolved challenge of Kurdish separatism. Turkey's relations with Iran, which heretofore have been manageable, could become more prone to crisis.

All of these considerations point to the serious risks that seeking nuclear weapons would pose to Turkey's security. These risks could in turn exacerbate internal discord in the country at a time when the ruling Justice and Development Party is struggling to retain popular support.

In these circumstances, it matters how the rest of the world portrays and talks about Turkey's nuclear future. To assert that Turkey will naturally – perhaps inevitably – seek to acquire a nuclear arsenal ignores the important incentives the country has not to militarise its existing civilian energy programme.

Glib talk of nuclear proliferation risks should not mislead Turks about their own interests. The rest of the world would be wiser instead to reaffirm the country's efforts to pursue a purely peaceful nuclear energy programme and to work within NATO to seek a resolution of the Iranian challenge.

George Perkovich & Sinan Ulgen
© Project Syndicate 2015
George Perkovich is Vice President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and co-editor of the book "Turkey's Nuclear Future".Sinan Ülgen is Chairman of the Istanbul-based Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) and a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels. He is co-editor of the book "Turkey's Nuclear Future".