Infiltrated but strategically undefeated

At first glance, the situation in Lebanon does not look good for Hezbollah. The Shiite militia is far from defeated but it is currently outgunned. By planting manipulated pagers and radios, the Israeli secret service managed to strike a blow against Hezbollah's communications system. Thirty-two people were killed and thousands injured, not all of them members of Hezbollah. 

The attack hit right at the heart of the militia, with a corresponding psychological effect. It was accompanied by the targeted killing of high-ranking Hezbollah commanders. Israel has obviously infiltrated the militia long concerned with maintaining secrecy. Their secret service appears to be in possession of inside information allowing Israel to take targeted action against the military leadership of Hezbollah.

Qualitatively, this is the most important divergence from Hezbollah’s last major clash with the Israeli army in 2006. Even then, Israel possessed the most technologically sophisticated espionage system in the world; it was, for example, the first war in which reconnaissance drones played an important role. But in 2006, Israel was still short on human intelligence - spies within Hezbollah - which was one reason why the Israeli army was surprised by the fierce resistance during its ground offensive.

Hezbollah seems to hold back

Infiltration of its ranks is now one of Hezbollah’s weakest spots. This has, in turn, led some observers to also presume that Hezbollah's military potential is weak. But that is hard to assess. Why, for example, has Hezbollah not already launched a major missile attack on Israel, given the enormous pressure it’s under?

In its attacks on Israel to date, Hezbollah has predominantly deployed relatively imprecise Katjusha rockets which have limited power and range. Only occasionally has it used more powerful missiles which offer higher accuracy, for the most part to attack military targets in Haifa or Tel Aviv. These were largely intercepted by the Israeli missile defence system.

So why is Hezbollah not deploying its full rocket and missile potential, estimated to consist of tens of thousands of high-explosive missiles? Have Western intelligence services overestimated its arsenal? Or has Israel, as it claims, already succeeded in destroying a large part of the arsenal through the massive bombing campaign in Hezbollah strongholds in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley of recent days?

A third explanation is more plausible still. The Shiite militia may be deliberately holding back its missiles for strategic reasons. Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu has justified the recent escalation in Lebanon with a stated goal of returning the 60,000 Israeli civilians evacuated from northern Israeli border towns almost a year ago.

Hezbollah does not have to launch a full-scale missile and rocket attack to thwart that plan. From a strategic point of view, it only has to show that it continues to pose a long-term threat to Israel. Firing a limited number of rockets on a regular basis is enough. The most important strategic goal for Hezbollah in this scenario would be to ensure that its rocket and missile capacity survives the storm.

Is the ground offensive coming?

An Israeli ground offensive may now be looming. When Israeli soldiers last invaded Lebanon in 2006, Israel initially announced that its aim was to destroy Hezbollah. A few days after the start of the offensive, its stated goal became weakening rather than destroying the militia, a goal it also failed to achieve. Not only is the current militia better equipped than ever before, but its political wing has participated in every government in Beirut since 2006. Hezbollah has expanded its position as a state within a state.

Both Hezbollah and the Israeli army have been preparing for another invasion since 2006. If there is another ground offensive, the deciding factor will be how much the Israeli army knows about Hezbollah's preparations. If it is as well informed about that as it was about the whereabouts of Hezbollah’s commanders, it may have a better hand this time.

But what would Israel gain strategically from a ground offensive? Even if the army occupies Lebanese territory, it can hardly create a buffer zone large enough to prevent Hezbollah's longer-range rockets from reaching Israel.

This would also hold true in the unlikely event that Israel puts enough military pressure on Hezbollah that it agrees to withdraw behind the Litani River. This river in southern Lebanon runs parallel to the border with Israel, up to 30 kilometres away. Since 2006, UN Resolution 1701 has called for a withdrawal by Hezbollah, but neither Hezbollah nor Israel (which has violated Lebanese airspace tens of thousands of times since then) have complied with the demands.

All roads lead through Gaza

The question remains as to a way out. Netanyahu's approach - attempting to force an end to Hezbollah’s rocket fire by means of escalation - is obviously a strategic miscalculation. The way to end the war in Lebanon is through the Gaza Strip. Last year, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, repeatedly emphasised that the attacks on Israel were in response to the war in Gaza. He wants to exert pressure to make Israel stop its military offensive in the Gaza Strip.

An end to the war in Gaza would, in other words, also end the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. The key to de-escalation, which is urgently needed by the entire region, lies in negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza and an exchange of Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners.

Such an agreement is the basic prerequisite for creating calm on all fronts, giving the international community the opportunity to finally devote itself to long-term solutions to the Palestinian question and the Middle East conflict. Right now however, we are far from such an agreement. Worse yet: rather than working to extinguish the fire, more fuel is added every day.

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